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Preface
As the keystone event of a research program called “Africa 2060,” the Frederick 
S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston  University 
convened a conference on April 16, 2010 called Africa 2060: Good News from 
Africa. The program featured more than a dozen expert panelists from  Boston 
University and across the world, and the approximately 100 participants 
included many African scholars and citizens from the continent who contrib-
uted to lively and well-informed discussion. The Pardee Center conference was 
co-sponsored by Boston University’s Africa Studies Center (ASC), the African 
Presidential Archives & Research Center (APARC), and the Global Health & 
Development Center (GHDC). 
Instead of providing a transcript or a typical raportage on the conference, we are 
adopting a different approach with this report, which consists of commentary 
reflecting upon and information pertaining to the substance of the conference. 
An introductory overview reflects upon the major issues discussed at the event, 
which are placed within the larger literature on Africa’s future. Four short essays 
prepared by Boston University graduate students provide readers with more 
specific reflections and highlights of each conference session and the main 
issues discussed by panelists. The final section presents analyses of key trends 
and projections related to societal, economic, and governance issues for Africa 
and a commentary on what this information tells us about the drivers that will 
determine the continent’s future. 
We hope this conference report offers insights into new directions for Africa in 
the first half of the 21st century. Feedback is welcome and appreciated. Video of 
the conference is available at the Pardee Center website at www.bu.edu/pardee/
multimedia .
Many people contributed to the development of the conference and this report 
and deserve special thanks. Pardee Fellows Alfredo Burlando, Julius Gatune 
Kariuki, and Heran Sereke-Brhan did much of the work to identify and invite 
panelists and conceptualize the program, and also contributed significantly 
to the writing and editing of this report. Boston University graduate students 
Sophia Aba Jebel, Trevor Green, Jamie Mercurio, and Tithee Mukhopadhyay 
wrote summaries of conference sessions and helped compile and analyze 
information presented in the trends and projections section. Pardee Center staff 
vi   
member Cynthia Barakatt served as the final editor of the report, and the confer-
ence logistics were overseen by Pardee Center staff members Theresa White and 
Elaine Teng. The Pardee Center thanks all of the panelists (listed in the agenda 
and presenters’ biographies section of this report) for contributing their time 
and expertise, and all who attended the conference on April 16. The discussion 
sessions were quite engaging and informative because of the participation of so 
many knowledgeable Africa scholars and well-informed global citizens.
Professor Adil Najam 
The Frederick S. Pardee Professor of Global Public Policy  
Director, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future 
Boston University
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1.  africa 2060:  
What Will drive the Good news From africa?
Adil Najam and Julius Gatune Kariuki
The 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup 
hosted by South Africa has once again shined a spotlight on the continent. The 
tournament’s theme song—”This Time for Africa,” sung by Shakira—resounds 
on television sets, iPods, and stereo systems around the globe. It captures the 
scintillating rhythms, vibes, and energy that the world has come to associate 
with Africa, and in many real ways the world cheered the continent of Africa as 
much as it did any particular team as the tournament unfolded. Yet, this is not 
the first time that the world has cheered the continent, or been captivated by its 
great potential. Those who have followed Africa’s development fortunes know 
the story too well: bursts of peaking global interest (optimism), followed by peri-
ods of global neglect (pessimism); recognition of continental potential, followed 
by litanies of despair and dismay; expressions of great expectations, followed by 
prognoses of hopelessness and helplessness (Gatune Kariuki 2010; Fosu 2009).
As the world sways to Shakira’s beat, it does seem that this time could be dif-
ferent. According to most development indicators, Africa remains the continent 
with the most poverty, least human development, and most dismal develop-
ment statistics. Yet, since the beginning of the new millennium, a number of key 
trends are moving in the right direction (Okonjo-Iwaela 2010). By most mea-
sures, Africa’s knowledge economy remains behind all other continents, but a 
revolution of technological leapfrogging—especially in the innovative use of cell 
phones—seems under way on the continent (Economist 2009). Africa remains 
home to a very large number, and even larger proportions, of the world’s poor, 
but the continental as well as national economies seem to be on the mend and 
are unleashing the entrepreneurial potential of the African population (Mahajan 
2008). Many perennial conflicts linger and institutions of national governance 
remain fragile—and some states like Zimbabwe and Somalia flirt with the brink 
of collapse. But unlike any other point in its history, most of the continent is 
today under democratic and elected rule (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009). The 
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development gains Africa has made and seems poised to make remain fragile, 
the record is mixed, the optimism could be fleeting, and some degree of skepti-
cism is justified (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2007; Young 2010).
As one looks at Africa’s future, several questions emerge: which of these gains 
can be consolidated? Which of the positive trends will be sustained? Has this 
recent period of global attention provided the continent with a real institutional 
scaffolding on which a positive future can be built? And what needs to be done 
to ensure that the dangers of chronic poverty, conflict, and institutional collapse 
that still lurk in the shadows will be contained long enough that they eventually 
disappear? These and other such questions inspired the Africa 2060: Good News 
from Africa conference in April 2010 organized by Boston University’s Frederick 
S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer Range Future. In reflecting upon 
the ideas discussed at the conference by leading experts on different aspects 
of Africa’s economic, political, social, and cultural development, we seek to 
highlight some of the key drivers that are likely to shape the longer-range future 
of the continent. 
We base our observations on the intense discussions during the conference 
by practitioners and experts with an engaged and informed audience, plus a 
broader reading of the literature, including that which was presented at the con-
ference. These observations reflect a locus of expert and informed opinion and 
provide a window into the priorities that are engaging the imaginations of those 
thinking deep and hard about Africa’s future. We also understand, of course, that 
there are “many Africas” and many realities within Africa. To say anything about 
the entire continent is to condemn oneself to saying only that which can be 
easily generalized. We choose to do so knowingly. We do so with great respect, 
even reverence, for the specific and the nuanced, but also with the recognition 
that identifying larger overlaying trends—and the driving forces behind those 
trends—is a useful enterprise. Despite all its known limitations, this exercise can 
lead to a better identification of those specific and nuanced national and local 
policy levers that have the greatest potential of triggering positive change, even 
at the continental scale. 
drIVers OF aFrICa’s FUtUre
In addressing the conference’s title, speakers identified much that can be clas-
sified as “good news” from Africa: poverty in Africa is falling, and falling fast 
(Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2007); food productivity is rising  (Denning 2009); 
inequality is falling (Young 2010); women are assuming positions of leadership 
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(Ngunjiri 2006); democracy and elections are becoming the norm (Rotberg and 
Gisselquist 2009); regional markets are developing (Mahajan 2008); anti-corrup-
tion measures are gaining prominence (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009); Africa is 
becoming an important destination for foreign direct investment, especially from 
China (Mahajan 2008); African intelligentsia is finding a more prominent voice in 
defining Africa’s options (Zewde 2008); and continent-wide cultural expression is 
strengthening a positive continental identity (Adichie 2010). 
A number of persistent challenges and hurdles to progress were also identi-
fied: serious health deficiencies plague the continent and many are increasing 
in intensity (ECA 2007); access and availability of education in Africa remain 
dismal (OECD 2009); even economies experiencing high growth rates have a 
high number of poor living at the margin (ECA 2007); serious challenges of food 
security remain (World Bank 2008); concerns about foreign direct investment 
overwhelming local development priorities persist (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 
2009); major institutional and governance lapses run the risk for over-turning the 
democratic gains on the continent (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009); the population 
of unemployed and restless urban youth grows larger (Sommers 2009); and there 
is a criminal element in entrepreneurship activities (Kiggundu 2002).
From the nuances of this rich discussion, we distill seven key drivers that are 
of particular importance in shaping Africa’s longer-range future. Of course, all 
of these can operate in either a positive or a negative direction. As many of the 
speakers at the Pardee Center conference made clear, it is the decisions that will 
be made by African and international policy-makers, businesses, civic organi-
zations, and citizens today that will determine which direction Africa will be 
“driven” towards tomorrow.
driver #1: Perceptions
Speaking at the Pardee Center conference, Vijay Mahajan, author of Africa Ris-
ing (2008) made the passionate case that how Africa views itself may be even 
more important than how it is viewed by the rest of the world. Indeed, the two 
perceptions reinforce each other, which is why Africa has the ability—as it did 
in the recent FIFA World Cup—to rebrand itself as a continent recognized for its 
vibrancy, diversity, and energy rather than its poverty, instability, and conflicts. 
Although it was not always seen as such (Gatune Kariuki 2010), since the era of 
colonialism there has been a tendency towards “Afro-pessimism” as character-
ized by Joseph Conrad’s description of Africa as the “heart of darkness.” These 
powerful forces of perception have shaped not only how outsiders have viewed 
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Africa, but also how Africans themselves view their continent. The tendency 
to extrapolate and generalize the bad news, to consider any good news to be 
an anomaly, and to believe that a pessimistic portrayal will forever be the most 
persistent, has been a dominant trait within the continent’s own discourse.
Moments such as this one—when many economic, social, and governance 
indicators are moving in a positive direction—are critical because they provide 
opportunities to turn these perceptions around. Creating within the continent a 
confidence in its own potential becomes even more important for the youth in 
this most youthful of continents both because such confidence is key in nurtur-
ing the spirit of entrepreneurism in the future, and because an absence of such 
confidence can push the restless young into the depths of despair, with signifi-
cant social consequences (Sommers 2009). 
Recent examples of the changing international perception of both China and 
India demonstrate that (a) even deep-rooted international perceptions can 
change, and change very swiftly, and (b) that a change in a community’s confi-
dence in its own abilities is a necessary precursor to a change in international 
perception (Mahajan 2008). There is an opportunity to turn world perception, 
which has historically been preoccupied with “worrying” about Africa, towards 
viewing its own future as being intertwined with Africa’s. The good news that is 
coming from Africa—from individual icons such as Nelson Mandela, to success-
ful world events such as the FIFA World Cup, to strengthening democracy and 
stability on the continent—is driving a subtle change in international percep-
tions. Most important of these is the shift in international finance, where Africa 
has long been viewed as a place to “send aid to” and is now beginning to be also 
seen as a place to “invest in.”
It is not entirely clear whether world perceptions about Africa will actually shift. 
But it is clear that these perceptions will influence the continent’s ability to shape 
the reality it wants in the future. It is even clearer that how the world imagines 
Africa in the future will be influenced by how the continent imagines itself. 
driver #2: Governance
Governance remains Africa’s perennial challenge (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009). 
There are many persistent challenges—including corruption—that continue to 
plague the continent, and countries like Zimbabwe and Somalia have become 
internally and internationally dysfunctional (although for different reasons). 
However, continent-wide the story is clearly one of improvement. The regular 
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military coups of the 1970s and 1980s are now aberrations rather than norms. 
Elected democracies, even if imperfect ones, have begun to take root across the 
continent. The media is also freer. Public outcry against corruption is louder and 
efforts to curb it are becoming more common, even though not always success-
ful. Overall, the trend in governance moves towards improvement, although 
slowly and with many pock-
ets of serious concern, within 
and across countries on the 
continent. As Robert Rotberg 
pointed out in his presen-
tation, this positive trend 
needs to be nurtured and 
strengthened, but it is equally 
important to focus on cases within the continent (such as Zimbabwe) where deep 
problems persist. This, he argued, needs to be done with a sense of urgency to 
ensure that these cases do not start influencing other parts of the continent and 
destroy the gains that have been made elsewhere.
To better understand governance, new and sophisticated tools have been devel-
oped and are being taken increasingly seriously by African leaders. For instance, 
the Africa Governance Index (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009) has been widely 
accepted and leaders, such as those in Rwanda, have shown great interest in 
understanding what they can do to improve their ranking in a given category. 
Though many leaders may dispute specific rankings, the fact that they are trying 
to decipher the ranking components is itself a sign that they care about how 
their governance is perceived internationally, and are willing to make changes 
in their own actions in order to change these perceptions. Such efforts have also 
begun to produce regional role models of “best practices” that others can use 
as motivation and work to emulate. For example, in his keynote address to the 
Pardee Center conference, Ambassador Kaire Mbuende of Namibia described 
how his own country is gaining world-wide recognition for its fisheries poli-
cies. He noted that Namibians with foresight studied the lessons learned by 
Norway in its fisheries policies, and improved and adapted those policies for 
the  Namibian context. Similarly, Bostwana is gaining international accolades 
for how it manages its mineral resources. We have also seen improvements in 
 Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Congo, which have signed on to the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Index (EITI); indeed of the 32 countries implementing 
EITI, 20 are in sub-Saharan Africa (EITI 2010).
Elected democracies, even if imperfect 
ones, have begun to take root across the 
continent. The media is also freer. Public 
outcry against corruption is louder and ef-
forts to curb it are becoming more common, 
even though not always successful.
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Good leadership begets good governance, which in turn begets good participa-
tory culture, which begets good institutions. As Ambassador Mbuende, Robert 
Rotberg, and Oyeronke Oyewumi highlighted at the conference, leadership will 
be a key determinant of Africa’s future. Of course, the most iconic example of 
leadership turning around a polity in Africa is that of Nelson Mandela’s in South 
Africa, but now a crop of less iconic but effective leadership from democratic 
rather than revolutionary roots has begun to emerge. One example often cited is 
that of Ghana, which is maturing as a democracy and had a peaceful transition 
despite closely contested elections. But good governance is driven not only by 
political leadership but also leadership in other arenas: for example, leadership 
in business and civic spheres were cited repeatedly at the Pardee Center confer-
ence as key drivers of positive changes in the future. 
driver #3: Knowledge and education 
Knowledge and education are going to drive the future everywhere, not just in 
Africa. But they become even more important for Africa’s future because the 
continent lags so far behind other parts of the world in these areas. While the 
forces of globalization and technological dissemination may be providing Africa 
with important opportunities to catch up—maybe even leapfrog—in some areas, 
the essential knowledge challenges of Africa remain deep. Without the driver 
of knowledge and education being mobilized, any gains from other drivers of 
change could be lost.
On the positive side, there are examples of elite schools in Africa—like the Afri-
can Leadership Academy (ALA 2010)—selecting and working with Africa’s top 
young students, training them at the most rigorous global standards to prepare 
the best in Africa to compete with the best globally. At the same time, the inter-
net is opening new avenues of knowledge and opportunity and in many ways 
leveling the global knowledge playing field for Africans, just as it has already 
done for new generations of Chinese and Indians. As Nathan Eagle pointed out 
at the conference, the talent for software development amongst the young in 
Africa is no less than anywhere in the world. 
However, for this driver the overall story is far from positive. Speaker after 
speaker at the conference pointed out that in many different ways education 
systems across Africa are failing the young people they are meant to serve. The 
issues that were highlighted include: education remains highly rationed; there 
is a steep pyramid structure where the majority of those who enter school leave 
only with a primary education; access to education is restricted to the rich; even 
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for many in the middle class, few make it to secondary school and fewer still 
to universities, and those who do find themselves in institutions facing massive 
resource and related constraints. A participant pointed out that in Nigeria, for 
example, there are over two million applicants for higher education, but only 
100,000 positions. Another participant noted that in Ethiopia, schools operate as 
many as three “shifts” in a day and the local refrain is that they have turned into 
“daycare” centers rather than serving as places of learning. Harounan Kazianga 
noted that in Burkina Faso, many families with low and unstable incomes do 
not see enough utility in education to send children to school. Similar examples 
were citied all across the continent. 
The future implications of these challenges are severe and multidimensional. 
In a world that is already being defined by knowledge economies, educational 
deficits can lead to long-term disempowerment. But even in the more immedi-
ate term, the cost of educational deficiencies, for example, on health—as was 
pointed out by Richard Clapp—can be severe (Naidoo et al. 2008). Given the 
age structure of this very young continent, these educational challenges are 
exacerbating the cadres of disenfranchised, unemployed, and often unemploy-
able youth—often congregating in volatile and growing urban centers, as Marc 
Sommers (2009) detailed—who already pose serious social challenges to their 
communities and indeed to their own futures.
Overall, this driver of Africa’s future is important not only because it is such a 
universal driver of change, but even more so because the general direction of 
trends for this driver remains negative. This makes it, therefore, a high priority 
for action today if the continent’s future is to be more secure.
driver #4: technology
Technology leapfrogging has been one of the most striking “good news” stories 
from Africa. In particular, the rapid spread of cell phones in the continent has 
been the poster child for the potential of technology for development, not just in 
Africa but across the developing world. 
However, technology can be a double-edged sword. Agriculture is a good 
example of a sector where the past promise of technology has failed to deliver 
and also where technology has sometimes led to unintended negative conse-
quences. Seventy percent of the African population and 30 percent of its GDP is 
supported by agriculture (ECA 2007). However, despite advances in agricultural 
technologies and significant gains made elsewhere, Africa still suffers from low 
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agricultural productivity, and consequently from food shortages (World Bank 
2008). But even as the benefits of new technologies, such as the use of pesti-
cides, have not translated to increased food security, negative consequences 
have begun to accumulate. For example, pesticide use in South Africa, the most 
agriculturally advanced country in Africa, has been linked to numerous health 
problems including cancer and respiratory diseases as people inhale and ingest 
these persistent contaminants (Naidoo et al. 2008). 
But the overall story of technology as a driver of Africa’s future is a net positive 
one, largely because of the rapid diffusion of mobile telephones. This diffu-
sion has begun to accumulate development benefits. For example, cheap and 
dependable mobile phones are allowing farmers to access market prices and get 
better deals for their produce 
(Economist 2009). Mobile 
phone penetration combined 
with rapid and widespread 
improvement in skills in 
application development is 
sparking a wave of frantic 
innovation. For example, in 
Rwanda an application has 
been built that now allows 
people to pay for electricity in the same way people buy air-time via use of 
scratch cards. In Kenya, a mobile banking innovation, M-PESA, is bringing 
banking services to a whole new market of consumers and making it easier for 
people to transfer money, trade in vital services, and even save money. Mobile 
phones in Kenya are now becoming essential tools of business, allowing day 
laborers to not only find work but also to be paid for that work through micro-
transactions over the mobile phone. Mobile phones are thus having a direct 
impact on large numbers of Africans, including those at the bottom of the eco-
nomic scale (Economist 2009).
Technology, of course, is not a panacea. But a culture of continuous innova-
tion is. For instance, as Dr. Nathan Eagle explained at the Pardee Center 
conference, in Kenya a mobile phone application was developed to better 
monitor availability of blood supply and improve the management of blood 
banks. However, the application failed to draw participation until a method 
was found for linking this application to an innovative way to pay nurses 
through micro-transactions for reporting blood availability. The application, 
Mobile phones in Kenya are now becom-
ing essential tools of business, allowing day 
laborers to not only find work but also to be 
paid for that work through micro-transac-
tions over the mobile phone. Mobile phones 
are thus having a direct impact on large 
numbers of Africans, including those at the 
bottom of the economic scale.
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he pointed out, has subsequently revolutionized the availability of real-time 
data in an area critical to health care.
However, the possible dark side of new technologies is always present. For 
instance, as Eagle pointed out, broadcast mobile phone text messages have also 
been used as instruments for spreading hate. Broadcast text messages, for exam-
ple, contributed greatly to poisoning the atmosphere in the prelude to Kenya’s 
post-election violence that took many lives. Such examples should highlight the 
need for care and caution, but they should not stop us from benefiting from the 
great potential of technology as a key driver of positive change. 
driver #5: entrepreneurship
Vijay Mahajan argues in Africa Rising (2008) that the greatest asset of Africa—the 
youngest continent with the fastest growing population—is the entrepreneurial 
zeal of its young. He also points out that although the image we have constructed 
of Africa is of poverty and deprivation, the continent as a whole is much more 
affluent than most people, even Africans, think. He pointed out in his presenta-
tion that if Africa is taken as a single economy, then it has a higher per capita 
income than India. There is also an already substantial and growing consumer 
middle class in Africa that is brand-conscious and makes up an important 
consumer class for quality products. This has not been lost on business, as both 
local and international companies are aggressively expanding in the African 
market. But it is the entrepreneurship of the young in Africa that holds the 
potential of turning all of the above into a major force in the future.
Africans are increasingly identifying opportunities and seizing them. Adaptation 
has been the keyword in the deployment of new technologies to respond to persis-
tent local needs. One good example from the cultural sphere is the phenomenal rise 
of the local Nigerian film industry—popularly referred to as “Nollywood.” As Pardee 
Center Research Fellow Dr. Heran Sereke-Brhan noted, lacking big budgets to make 
35 mm films and distribution networks to back them, innovators in Nigeria have 
adopted a different model. Using simple digital video cameras and shooting directly 
onto DVDs, they have greatly cut production costs. Today, Nollywood is credited as 
the world’s second-largest movie-making industry in the number of films made. The 
industry generates revenues of upwards of $75 million per year, Sereke-Brhan said, 
and employs between half a million to one million people. Other estimates have 
put revenues upwards of $200–300 million per year and over one million people 
employed (Economist 2006). According to Sereke-Brhan, it is estimated that Nol-
lywood now contributes $500–600 million to the GDP of Nigeria.
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Of course, entrepreneurship is not an easy venture and there are significant 
hurdles to reaching the potential in Africa. Weak governance is of particu-
lar importance because it results in a failure to provide the environment in 
which entrepreneurship can be incubated. According to Dr. Nathan Eagle, 
the government monopoly over wireless telecommunications in Ethiopia 
has restricted the extent that the mobile phone innovations seen elsewhere 
in Africa are not occurring in Ethiopia. Banking regulations in many African 
countries restrict the growth of mobile banking, which can stymie entrepre-
neurship. Credit constraints are also going to continue impacting the develop-
ment of small business innovators.
Unfortunately, it is also true that because of the lack of policy space to apply 
entrepreneurship to legitimate use, sometimes African entrepreneurship gets 
diverted to illegal and criminal activity, including the widespread, highly irritat-
ing, and largely unsuccessful internet scams of various types that have become 
strongly associated with Africa. The solution here, again, lies in the governance 
driver already discussed. Governance comes into play in both cracking down on 
the illegality and in providing an environment where the entrepreneurial ener-
gies of the continent can be put to better use. In essence, the key to this driver of 
Africa’s future—as it is for many others, too—is good governance and, in particu-
lar, the ability of government to remove structural hurdles to Africa’s entrepre-
neurial spirit. This is starting to happen now as the World Bank’s Doing Business 
surveys indicate (Okonjo-Iwaela 2010).
driver #6: Globalization
Globalization has been a major driver of change in the last few decades and is 
likely to remain so at least in the near future. Globalization may have arrived a 
little late in Africa, but it is now arriving in full force. 
As Africa has become more integrated with the world, its links with both the 
West and the emerging powers in the South are becoming strong; in particular 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have seen a marked rise in recent 
years. China, India, the Middle East, and now Brazil are the new entrants into 
the African marketplace, helping to raise the continent’s status as a participant in 
the global arena. China, in particular, is taking the lead in investing in Africa and 
arguably has made a significant contribution to the recent growth spurt seen in 
Africa (Broadman 2007). China’s influence is spreading from economic to politi-
cal to cultural spheres. China is investing heavily in economic sectors, especially 
in construction, mining, and telecommunications. It is now also actively spread-
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ing Chinese culture through its cultural centers—the Confucius Institutes—that 
are proliferating on the continent (Broadman 2007).
But foreign direct investment flow resulting from increased connection to the 
world has its drawbacks. Investment often comes with expectations attached, no 
matter where it comes from. Africa has seen exploitation in the name of invest-
ment before, and the danger of experiencing it again is all too real even as new 
countries enter the fray. Mineral and oil exploitation has sometimes become a 
“resource curse” as governments focus on capturing rents at the expense of the 
citizens with the resource firms as facilitators (Friedman 2006; Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian 2003). Now new dangers lurk in the land leases where large 
swaths of land are being leased exclusively to foreign countries and firms for 
food and bio-fuel production for export back to investing countries (Blas and 
England 2008; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). These so-called “land grabs” 
are happening as nations scramble to secure their food supplies, often at the 
expense of the leasing countries in addition to disenfranchising local farmers. 
Although China is not the only country arriving in Africa on the wave of glo-
balization—Middle Eastern countries, India, and now Brazil, are also joining 
the European and American interests that have already been there—China has 
become a source of concern. For some observers, China is seen as infiltrating 
African societies. Some view its deals as being exploitative, such as fisheries 
exploitation off the coast of 
West Africa. Stories of corrup-
tion are rampant. But these 
practices are not, and have 
not historically been, limited 
to China’s dealings on the con-
tinent. They are endemic to foreign investment in Africa. The driver of Africa’s 
future, however, will not be the magnitude or even the quality of these incursions 
in globalization. Instead, it will be Africa’s own response to these incursions. As 
Dr. Julius Gatune Kariuki pointed out at the conference, if Africa builds upon the 
potential of these transfers and uses it for its own developmental interests, then 
this could be a positive driver.
For example, the presence of new players seems to be improving the policy-
making environment in many parts of Africa. By providing flexibility in how 
Africa can finance development, this new environment is helping governments 
in Africa to recover policy space that had been lost in the strict conditionality of 
The driver of Africa’s future, however, will not 
be the magnitude or even the quality of these 
incursions in globalization. Instead, it will be 
Africa’s own response to these incursions.
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financing from the West and from multilateral development institutions such as 
the World Bank. This itself has proved to be a major driver of change in the avail-
ability as well as deployment of international finance in Africa.
One aspect, however, was clear at the Pardee conference on Africa: the locus of 
global power relationships with Africa is changing. Through an intense day of 
discussions on all of Africa and its future, the single country that was mentioned 
more often than any other and discussed with more vigor was China. Surpris-
ingly, neither the United States nor Europe was mentioned much. Clearly, there 
is a power shift in progress, and Africa is beginning to look East rather than West 
as it seeks the fruits of globalization that had earlier seemed to pass it by.
driver #7: society 
A major theme of this entire paper—and of the Pardee Center conference—is that 
Africa’s future will be shaped most of all by Africa itself. That means that politi-
cal, economic, and social dynamics within African society are of paramount 
importance. There are many aspects of how African societies develop that will 
drive its future, but two areas of particular importance are women and youth.
Oyewumi’s work (2005), for example, shows an upward trend in women join-
ing leadership ranks in Africa (see also Ngunjiri 2006). Liberia has a woman 
president and seven countries in Africa now have more than 30 percent women 
parliamentarians, while Rwanda leads the world in having the largest propor-
tion of women parliamentarians (BBC 2008). But the change in the attitudes of 
and attitudes toward women in the public sphere is even more fundamental. For 
instance, Paliwala, in his presentation, noted that Malawi has a creative new pro-
gram that allows women to address injustices that have been inflicted on them 
through a unique system that counsels and re-integrates men rather than using 
the conventional legal systems or the traditional systems that employ elders.
Youth, like women, constitute a major proportion of Africa’s population and 
similarly have the potential to drive dramatic changes in African society. This is 
particularly evident in the work of Marc Sommers (2009). He finds high levels 
of disenfranchisement and disengagement, particularly among Sierra Leone’s 
urban youth. Most lack jobs, have very little education, and are moving from 
rural areas to  teeming slums in the cities. In places of past or present violent 
conflict, the youth have been part of the violence, which has left them trauma-
tized and vulnerable. Because of cultural norms, young males who cannot afford 
a dowry or a piece of land are unable to marry, and thus cannot ascend to formal 
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membership of society. Society already views them as failures and this only 
exacerbates the alienation between mainstream society and large proportions 
of its youth. A major challenge is that the youth are largely unreachable. But 
this does not mean that they 
are not represented. Youth 
organizations are large and 
powerful in many countries 
across Africa. The challenge 
for policy-makers, according 
to Sommers, is to find ways to reach them so that they can become drivers of 
positive, rather than negative, change.
The shape of society in Africa will be influenced by these two key demographics, 
but also by a multitude of social cohesion forces, including the intelligentsia, writ-
ers, and public celebrities from various fields such as sports and entertainment. 
Bahru Zwede (2008) from Ethiopia considered some of these forces and articu-
lated the trends shaping the regional and continental identity of “African society” 
in these and related areas. The challenges of creating an African identity remain 
large, even though mega-events such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa 
help—as do global achievements of other African sports stars, for example in 
long-distance running. 
Ultimately, societal change will have to come at societal scales, and in particular 
from decisions made at very local levels in creating healthy and cohesive societ-
ies that can drive Africa to brighter futures.
FInal tHOUGHts
As we review the lessons from the 2010 Pardee Center’s Africa 2060: Good News 
from Africa conference, two overarching conclusions are evident.
First, Africa’s future will ultimately be driven by African decisions. There are 
many external forces—including those of technology and globalization—that are 
and will remain important, but in the final analysis these, too, will be shaped 
by the decisions made by Africans and in Africa. In particular, the first two and 
the last of the drivers we have identified are critical in shaping Africa’s contribu-
tion to its future. How Africa sees itself will determine the level of confidence 
the continent will assert in its own future. Governance, at every relevant level, 
will remain a key challenge but also a key opportunity and in many ways this 
is the most significant factor that steers every other driver in our list. Finally, it 
Youth, like women, constitute a major pro-
portion of Africa’s population and similarly 
have the potential to drive dramatic changes 
in African society.
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is forces within African society and how it develops over the next half century 
that will be as important as any economic force, external or internal. 
Second, there are a number of exciting opportunities that await Africa in its 
future, but many of these also come with potential hurdles and pitfalls. Innova-
tion, entrepreneurship, technology, knowledge, and globalization are among 
the areas that have generated significant “good news” to record from Africa. But 
within each of these areas there is also the potential and reality of bad news. 
Related to our first point, the choice now lies with African citizens, decision-
makers and societies as to whether they are able to make the type of decisions 
that will control the negative tendencies of these drivers and accelerate the posi-
tive tendencies.
There is no certainty that Africa’s immediate future will be any better than 
Africa’s immediate past. But there is plenty of reason to believe that it could be. 
And that decision rests in the hands of Africans themselves. The rest of the world 
cannot determine Africa’s future, but it can help the empowerment process for 
Africans to do it for themselves.
.
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2. reflections on africa: today and tomorrow
Edited and introduced by Cynthia Barakatt  
and Heran Sereke-Brhan 
The Pardee Center’s Africa 2060: Good News from Africa conference was con-
ceived as a means to gather interdisciplinary groups of leading scholars to dis-
cuss Africa’s possible futures in four major areas: social development, economic 
development, politics and institutions, and culture and society. To take advan-
tage of the expertise and local knowledge of the many more Africa scholars 
and citizens of the continent who were among the attendees, the sessions were 
designed to include ample time for discussion after each panel’s presentations.
This section features the reflections of four Boston University graduate students, 
each on one of the four main sessions. These reflections build upon the presen-
tations as well as the discussions, but are reflections of the authors rather than 
formal reportage. Each report seeks to highlight a small set of the many themes 
that were raised in the corresponding session. It should, therefore, be noted 
that the sum of what was discussed in each session was broader than what is 
presented here.
As they—and the introductory piece by Najam and Gatune Kariuki—note, consistent 
themes emerged throughout the day. First, there are positive trends for Africa in 
many areas, but serious long-term challenges remain. Second, while it is easy and 
tempting to generalize about “one Africa”, the continent’s individual countries and 
regions face different challenges and respond in different ways, depending on cul-
tural traditions and the strength of local governance. Finally, while outside investors 
and aid providers have a vested interest in the future of Africa, that future will be 
determined largely by the decisions and actions of Africans themselves.
sessIOn I: aFrICa’s sOCIal deVelOPMent
Jamie Mercurio
A diverse panel of experts on social development discussed issues best sum-
marized by session chair Jonathon Simon (Boston University) as “good, big, 
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and hot.” Within the “good” news there are “big” challenges on what consti-
tutes development, providing ”hot” topics for debate. Speakers presented on 
three specific areas of hot topics and good news, including the proliferation of 
academic peace studies programs around the world and in Africa; the grow-
ing awareness of the human health effects of pesticide use in South Africa; and 
the rapid and widespread increase in the use of mobile phones and their role 
in countries such as Kenya. Throughout the presentations, common themes 
included the notion of growth versus development, the importance of educa-
tion for Africa, and the “correct” method of capacity building. While panelists 
and conference participants may not have solutions for Africa’s quest for social 
development, discussions pointed to significant progress that has been made 
in the field. This is evidenced by a growing number of peace studies programs, 
increased South-South collaborations in agricultural projects, and the burgeon-
ing mobile phone industry. Clearly, these developments provide the foundation 
for further advancement.
Peace	Studies	in	Africa. Seble Dawit (Goucher College) began by discussing 
the increasing number of academic peace studies programs around the world, 
including in Africa. As of 2000, there were at least 350 institutions (two of which 
are in Africa) with such programs. Degrees offered from these institutions range 
from undergraduate to graduate and terminal degrees. Curriculum content varies 
from place to place, and although many seem to focus on conflict resolution—
which is perceived to produce mediators that can resolve any conflict— others 
highlight pre-conflict issues. These pre-conflict programs include a focus on 
peace and justice, specifically the idea of structural violence, and the role of edu-
cation on peace, such as the possibility of K–12 education having a non-violence 
framework at its core. Other programs explore the intersection between peace 
and history or peace and psychology. While existence of such programs in Africa 
is good news, Dawit admits that finding information about them can be difficult, 
preventing awareness of a newer academic discipline and possibly hindering 
interested students from attending. 
Pesticide	Use	and	Health	Effects	in	Northern	KwaZulu-Natal,	South	Africa. 
Richard Clapp (Boston University) spoke about what began as an act of “post-
Apartheid solidarity work” in 1990—a study funded by the U.S. Fogarty Inter-
national Center at the National Institutes of Health in collaboration with the 
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. Led by University of Cape 
Town’s Leslie London (affectionately known as “Dr. Pesticide”), the project sought 
to investigate the health effects, specifically that of brain disorders among 
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women and children, stemming from pesticide use (Naidoo et al. 2008). This 
study is important because it addresses the health effects of common practices 
in agriculture, one of the largest industries on the continent. While pesticides 
may lead to increasing crop yields, adverse health effects lead to lower produc-
tivity—negating any positive effect.
Pesticides cause many occupational injuries in the developing world, but are 
also a common suicide mechanism. Northern KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa 
had increasing levels of exposures and soil contamination from the agricultural 
and vector control uses of pesticides. In regions where malaria is endemic, DDT 
use was necessary to enable people to work the fields. Aside from occupational 
exposures in fields by skin contact (dermal), inhalation (airborne droplets), 
and incidental ingestion (soil, larger particles), women and children were often 
exposed to DDT in the home. These exposures included wet clay masks (filled 
with pesticide runoff) used as sun block, old pesticide containers used for water 
storage, and home storage of occupational pesticides. 
As for the good news in pesticide use in Africa, Clapp shared that there is an 
increasing global connectedness of research and policy work and growing South-
South collaborations. One South-South network, which includes teams from 
South Africa, Tanzania, Brazil, and Costa Rica, has helped to raise awareness of 
and provide training on the health risks of pesticides. 
Phone	Technology—The	Next	Frontier. Nathan Eagle (MIT; Txteagle, Inc.) shifted 
the geographical focus up the eastern coast of the continent to Kenya and eastern 
Africa, where he has made use of very large datasets, which in Africa primarily 
come from cell phones. These datasets are a new phenomenon, driven by tech-
nology companies that collect massive amounts of information, such as locations, 
calls, and movement from their subscribers. Eagle stressed that when discussing 
data generated by individuals’ activities, there is a need to move past the negative 
“Big Brother” understanding, which implies governments are gathering and using 
data to control the public. Instead, researchers and policy-makers should explore 
its use for social good. By understanding this data—for example, the common 
movements of mobile phone users in Africa and the high traffic areas in cities—
urban planners can determine the best location for building public services or 
roads, and ultimately have a positive impact on health and development.
Eagle’s activities in Africa exemplify a few growing trends in development, espe-
cially the mobile phone industry. His curriculum on mobile phone application 
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development at the University of Nairobi was so popular that he began training 
teachers (as opposed to students), which has proven to be one of the most suc-
cessful methods of capacity building—allowing exponentially more people access 
to education. He believes the 
curriculum has been success-
ful because it responds to 
local demands, for example, 
allowing applications to be 
designed for the native mar-
ket. Africans may not need 
the remote car starter application for Apple’s iPhone, but instead students can 
create locally in-demand applications for the more inexpensive phones com-
monly found on the continent. The curriculum has also been successful because 
of a focus on entrepreneurship and incentives, which has led to many successful 
start-ups—such as a way to purchase electricity in Rwanda via scratch cards and 
cell phones, much like the purchase of mobile airtime. 
The final development realized in Eagle’s work was discovered after a failed 
attempt at optimizing blood delivery at a coastal Kenyan hospital via mobile 
phone texting technology. Eagle saw that mobile technology provides a simple 
way to make existing systems more efficient. In the example he discussed, 
nurses who knew that blood level supplies were low in their clinics were able 
to text ahead and arrange for replenishment and get compensated airtime for 
their effort. This was the basis behind the creation of his company, Txteagle, Inc., 
which has created a new outsourcing industry in Kenya, generating up to $20 
million in potential business by switching from large structures with consider-
able overhead costs to individuals with a cell phone or laptop in a cyber café in 
remote areas. However, negative issues with the growth of the industry cannot 
be ignored. In some countries, cell phones have been used to organize protests 
and riots, and others question if the growing profits of the industry are coming at 
the expense of the poor who are not reaping any of the benefits. As the indus-
try grows and develops, Eagle believes that the current and potential benefits 
outweigh the few negatives, but that diligence is still necessary.
Questions	and	Discussion. The panelists’ presentations were followed by “hot” 
topics for debate, and three overarching themes emerged. The first was the tension 
between growth versus development. Questions were raised about the rapid growth 
of the telecom industry, which led to large profits for firms, but no improvements 
on the ground in Africa. Clapp stressed that growth does not necessarily result in 
Africans may not need the remote car 
starter application for Apple’s iPhone, but 
instead students can create locally in-de-
mand applications for the more inexpensive 
phones commonly found on the continent.
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development, but Eagle added that the growth of the mobile and telecom industry 
is adding value to Africa. Africans are now connected with the world through this 
new mode of communication. People are also able to easily transfer funds, and 
even start saving money in more secure ways (as opposed to previous methods of 
purchasing bricks or livestock). The increasing number of cell phones provides a 
tool for budding entrepreneurs, and the general opinion is that the growth of the 
mobile phone industry is doing more good than harm. 
The next theme was the importance of access to education. Whether education 
comes from peace study programs, South-South partnerships, or mobile learn-
ing, it is important for education to come from Africa. Clapp stressed that it may 
not always be effective to export U.S. or Western ideals, especially in agriculture, 
to Africa, and that the knowledge needs to be home grown. Dawit maintains 
that this indigenous knowledge should be the basis for African-based analysis 
and decision-making on social, economic, and political issues, informing how 
governments open markets or structure education. The lasting effects of colonial-
ism need to be confronted before peace is possible. 
The final theme that arose during the discussion session was the need to discern the 
correct method of capacity building. Dawit stressed that capacity building can only 
occur if training and educational efforts go both ways. Sending American students 
to study abroad in Africa is not enough—partnerships need to be mutually benefi-
cial. Eagle added that the successes he has seen by using the training-of-trainers 
method for capacity building can be sustainable, but only with a comprehensive 
approach. Increased skills and training for professors need to be coupled with bet-
ter compensation and a higher profile given to the profession, which is easier said 
than done in a continent experiencing obvious financial pressures. 
While the panel presentations and discussions may have raised more issues than 
they resolved, as Clapp explained, it is discussions such as these that lead to solu-
tions. If nothing further, the first panel of the Good News from Africa conference 
reinforced the idea that news from Africa’s social development is definitely “good, 
big, and hot.”
sessIOn II: MarKets & eCOnOMY
Tithee Mukhopadhyay
The global economic crisis spread around the world, but the story is more 
complex and more hopeful than many believe. For Africa, various trends are 
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pointing to positive economic development in the future, despite the continent’s 
numerous political, social, and environmental challenges. Pragmatism is driving 
stronger economic ties between Africa and the rest of the world and delivering 
opportunities to millions, despite setbacks. Yet Africa’s struggle seems far from 
over. The “Markets and Economy” panel took a closer look at the paradox of 
progress in the continent.
What trends have the potential to improve the economic landscape of Africa? 
Session Chair James McCann (Boston University) urged the use of “imagination” in 
identifying these propellants. Changing perceptions, entrepreneurial development, 
reducing credit constraints, demographic transition, and greater global integration 
were discussed as the greatest influences on the progress of the African economy.
Changing	Perceptions	through	the	Ages. Having emerged from centuries of 
insufferable oppression by colonial powers, bloody independence struggles, and 
corrupt home-grown regimes, Africa today is transforming and determined to 
join the mainstream globalization process. Julius Gatune Kariuki (Boston Uni-
versity) reviewed the historical changes in perceptions of Africa, noting its wide 
variation over time. He posits that a positive shift in perceptions will ultimately 
be one of the key drivers of the continent’s economic development. For instance, 
the continent was thought to be a symbol of greatness and power throughout the 
Greek and Roman eras. The phase of colonial power brought an end to this view, 
and the ghosts of the colonial past still haunt Africa’s present.
The achievement of independence galvanized a new spirit throughout Africa; 
growth increased as the promise carried by the “winds of change” swept across 
the continent. But the optimism was short lived. Weak political structures and 
archaic, alien institutions inherited from colonial powers resulted in failure to 
deliver the independence promised by modernization. This created opportuni-
ties for the establishment of military rule in Africa, transforming it into a “bloody 
continent” in the eyes of the world.
The 1973 and 1979 oil shocks exacerbated the situation that soon after ushered 
in global recessions. Africa as a whole fared poorly in this turbulent period. As 
a result, the high per capita income growth of 2.2 percent experienced in the 
1960s plunged to zero percent by the end of 1970s (Gatune Kariuki 2010). The 
Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s resulted in the downsizing of 
government spending, which in turn led to stagnancy and decline in develop-
ment. At this point, the continent was perceived as “Dying Africa.” The political 
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economy of Africa had reached its lowest trench. Over the next two decades, 
changing leadership, improvement in social conditions, and positive turns in the 
business climate, led to Africa’s resurgence; the first decade of the new millen-
nium has brought hope for a better future.
Entrepreneurship	in	Africa:	More	Power	to	the	People. Researchers have shown 
that poverty is a malady that incapacitates individuals economically, indirectly 
subjecting its victims to a state of destitution, powerlessness, and even violence. 
But can the hypothesis about misery and poverty in Africa be accepted with-
out challenge? Vijay Mahajan enlightened the gathering with often overlooked 
facts that point to progress. GDP per capita is one of the most important tools 
for a cross-country analysis of economic development. His comparative analy-
sis shows that there are 16 nations in Africa that have GDP per capita greater 
than that of China. In addition, remittances by immigrants in the U.S. amount 
to around $40 million per year, equal to Indian remittances. The tourist inflow 
to Africa is close to 25 million people every year, almost five times the annual 
number of tourists visiting India. Such numbers usually are associated with a 
booming hospitality industry.
In Mahajan’s view, entrepreneurship in Africa is vital to the empowerment of 
the poor because they are the most potent source of employment creation in the 
economy. Africa’s economic performance has improved dramatically in the last 
few years and conflicts in the region have decreased, setting the stage on which 
the continent will undergo a 
business metamorphosis that 
relies less on natural resources 
and more on innovation and 
private sector growth—hall-
marks of entrepreneurship. 
Africa has been breeding a 
generation of entrepreneurs 
with potential to be the new 
torchbearers. The entrepreneurial landscape is diverse and pro-active. It consists 
of micro- or small-scale informal sector vendors, traditional or multinational large-
scale formal sector firms, and global businesses. 
Entrepreneurs have the potential to strengthen private sector regional cooperation 
in African countries, to develop and expand formal commerce and trade among 
businesses regionally and globally, and to work with governments to change policy 
Entrepreneurs have the potential to 
strengthen private sector regional coopera-
tion in African countries, to develop and 
expand formal commerce and trade among 
businesses regionally and globally, and to 
work with governments to change policy 
and regulatory environments.
22   A Pardee Center Conference Report  |  April 2010
and regulatory environments. Mahajan asserts that the economy will be built 
by consumers and entrepreneurs in the near future. These entrepreneurs have 
influenced business practices, trade, and regulatory policies in their countries. The 
entrepreneurial zeal on the continent points towards a positive outlook among busi-
ness people and market players. This provides a different perspective on the future 
of the African economy and points to new avenues for investigation.
Unshackling	Constraints:	The	Role	of	Micro	Finance	Institutions. Informal and 
small-scale lending arrangements have long existed in many parts of the world, 
especially in rural areas, and they still survive. Good examples are schemes in 
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria (“merry-go-rounds,” “esusus,” etc.). They pro-
vide the rural population with access to savings within the local area and encour-
age community ownership. The groups formed provide joint collateral and serve 
as instruments for spreading valuable information that is useful for economic 
and social progress. But such initiatives are ineffective in insuring farmers against 
risks of geographical and environmental catastrophes. The absence of formal 
credit in Africa constrains optimizing the economic behaviour of farmers. 
Kazianga assumes a microeconomic perspective when analyzing these prevalent 
financial constraints. His data drew from the aftermath of a drought in Burkina 
Faso in 1984–85 to succinctly explain the nature of credit constraints and the 
solutions implemented. The farmers are most sensitive to economic shocks and 
this leads to risk-averse behaviour. They are disinclined to adopt new farm-
ing techniques as there are initial investments and uncertain outcomes. It is 
observed that households with capricious income arrangements are less likely 
to send their children to school. This highlights the strong need for formal credit 
and complete insurance to improve the productivity of farmers. 
Kazianga provides evidence of the effectiveness of small-scale financial innova-
tions in Burkina Faso. The Rainfall Risk Index Insurance set up there provides 
insurance to farmers involved in rain-fed agriculture. There are provisions like 
fertilizers and subsidized inputs that may increase per capita yields. The farmers 
are optimistic about this program. They are associating themselves with the 
microfinance institutions and testing micro insurance mechanisms. Such pro-
grams seem to have a future in this largely agrarian economy. 
Africa:	The	New-Age	Phoenix? The evidence for sub-Saharan Africa suggests 
that the recent economic recovery was influenced by improvements in macro-
economic policies and structural reforms. Margaret McMillan asserts that 
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research findings by venerated economists around the world confirm “good 
news from Africa.” She specifically discussed the research results of Alwyn 
Young (2009) and Maxim Pinkovskiy and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2007). 
Young used demographic and health surveys to conclude that measures of real 
consumption (based upon ownership of durable goods, quality of housing, 
health and mortality of children, education, etc.) indicate that sub-Saharan liv-
ing standards have been growing in excess of three percent per year, i.e. more 
than three times the rate indicated in international data sources like Penn World 
Tables and the UN Statistical Office.
The conventional wisdom that Africa is not reducing poverty is challenged by 
Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2007). They estimate income distributions, poverty 
rates, and inequality and welfare indices for African countries for the period 
1970–2006 and provide evidence that African poverty is falling, and falling 
rapidly. African poverty reduction is remarkably general: it cannot be explained 
by a large country, or by a single set of countries possessing some beneficial geo-
graphical or historical characteristic. They also emphasize that if present trends 
continue, the Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people 
with incomes less than one dollar a day will be achieved on time. 
McMillan also considers the demographic transition in Africa as a potential 
source that is propelling the economy. The growing labor force and human capi-
tal on the continent will provide it with a competitive edge. Rising commodity 
prices have been a classic indicator of economic growth, and thus Africa is on 
the economic growth path.
Africa-Can. Africa is seeing a dramatic transformation. Among other things, this 
favourable economic outlook is spurred by better governance, an improving 
business climate, innovation, market-based solutions, a more involved citizenry, 
and an increasing reliance on home-grown solutions. More and more, Africans 
are driving the continent’s development and the belief that Africa can harness 
this dynamism for long-lasting development.
sessIOn III: POlItICs and InstItUtIOns
Trevor Green
Africa has resources. Infrastructure is improving. Regimes are changing at 
the ballot box and the middle-class is growing. As the panel chair, Timothy 
 Longman, put it: “Africa is not just a place to be helped. It has a future.” 
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But that’s not enough. Africa’s bright future is an all-too-familiar story that often 
is derailed by tragedy. The Politics and Institutions panel delivered the message 
loud and clear: there is good news from Africa today, but that doesn’t guaran-
tee more tomorrow. The group of political scientists, gender and legal scholars 
provided plenty of Afro-optimism but were careful to temper it with a healthy 
dose of Africa’s volatile recent history. There was general agreement with Robert 
Rotberg’s (Harvard University) assertion that, to move forward, Africa needs good 
leadership and governance. This in turn will beget healthy political institutions 
and public participation while propelling the nation-states forward. 
Rotberg believes in the power of one, citing the emergence of “more Mandela-
like” leaders. His assertion is rooted in data from his 2009 Index of African 
Governance, which is based on five categories: Safety and Security; Rule of 
Law, Transparency, and Corruption; Participation and Human Rights; Sustain-
able Economic Opportunity; and Human Development. Most indices rating 
governance in Africa use a variation of the same broad categories comprised 
of more specific data. However—and herein lies the problem of rating African 
governance—the categories listed above are not mutually exclusive. Rwanda 
is an example of a country that loses points in the index for participation and 
human rights but gains even more for safety and security and rule of law. “The 
African Big Man role is even more vital in fragile societies,” claims Rotberg, 
“but there must be a vision, which is a vision for the entire country—not just 
one person.”
Local	Leadership	Is	Key. Is there such a thing as a benevolent dictator? If so, 
are foreign experts really equipped to make such a distinction? Abdul Paliwala 
(Warwick University) asks tough questions that often divide the development 
and human rights communities. He sees democracy and peace as a precursor to 
economic prosperity and observes part of the good news as increasing agency: 
“African people are taking command intellectually . . . and ordinary people are 
taking control of their own lives instead of relying on others.” For example, in 
Malawi, groups of women are organizing to encourage abusive men in the com-
munity to act more responsibly. This “bottom-up” approach to solving a civil 
society problem was in line with the grassroots, entrepreneurial spirit that Vijay 
Mahajan had identified in an earlier panel as key to Africa’s success in the busi-
ness sector. Just as we see small-scale enterprise blossoming throughout Africa, 
the development of a vibrant civil society signals a willingness by local groups to 
shape their own futures.
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Local leadership may well be the key to better governance in the future of the 
African continent. The fallacy concerning Africa is that there is one Africa. West-
ern political structures cannot 
be re-shaped to accommodate 
the varied historical legacies 
along with the ethnic, linguis-
tic, and religious diversity 
within each country, which 
breeds complicated representation issues. There is not a one-size-fits-all form of 
governance; rather, it should be left to Africans to decide how they want to be gov-
erned, assuming they have the political and civil freedoms to express opinions. 
Oyeronke Oyewumi (Stony Brook University) noted the recent visibility of 
women in African politics as evidence of more inclusive politics. She is ecstatic 
about the fact that Rwanda has the highest ratio of women in parliament in the 
world, Liberia has a female president, and several African states have parlia-
ments with at least 30 percent women members, placing them well above the 
world average of around 15 percent. Indeed the increasing participation of 
women in leadership roles signals progress that goes beyond the feminist move-
ment. The recent inclusion of women in African politics provides yet another 
historically underrepresented group with a voice—and that voice is being heard. 
This recent gender shift is most striking in post-conflict societies that offer signifi-
cant avenues of opportunity and change. Oyewumi said that she welcomes this 
development, not because she is a feminist, but because the African state is too 
important to be left to any one man, woman, or group.
The	Next	Generation:	What	Will	It	Hold? With their discussion of different 
sources of leadership, the panelists raised the following questions: Who can 
Africa look to in the future? Is it the prototypical African “Big Man”? The grass-
roots leader? Or will women be at the forefront of African politics? It will likely 
be some combination of the three, plus new and innovative forms of governance. 
In addition, China’s presence looms large whenever the conversation shifts 
to leadership and governance as it maintains a large portfolio of investment 
throughout Africa. Some observers watch this recent development with trepida-
tion because China generally refuses to attach human rights guarantees on new 
loans to African states, and has been engaged with dictatorial governments. 
China’s dealings are unlike those of the Western countries, which favor at least 
a modicum of civil and political freedom from would-be borrowers. Pressure 
Local leadership may well be the key to bet-
ter governance in the future of the African 
continent. The fallacy concerning Africa is 
that there is one Africa. 
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on China to condition new loans with human rights standards would be best 
applied by the African Union or regional bodies rather than Western powers. 
Nationalism in China might refute external pressure from foreign powers but it 
also motivates the government to act in a certain fashion appropriate for a global 
superpower. A positive shift in China’s stance on human rights standards would 
have a dramatic effect on African governments that continue to seek support for 
development initiatives. 
The structure and stability of various institutions in Africa is related to leadership 
and governance. The data on democratization illustrates a freer Africa today than 
30 years ago, and the presence of domestic civil society groups reflects much 
greater participation. Oyewumi suggested that governments are more engaged 
with their citizens than before, and this has improved political accountability. 
Furthermore, the new victim support groups, such as those in Mali, have sought 
to lessen society’s dependence on the government to solve all problems. This 
relates back to Paliwala’s assertion that individuals and civil society are finally 
beginning to drive success in Africa.
If we focus on the good news from the Politics and Institutions Panel, we see that 
new African leaders are emerging in various countries. Good governance does 
not begin and end with elected politicians but trickles down through the elemen-
tary school teachers, policemen, and doctors. Kaire Mbuende, the Namibian 
ambassador to the United Nations and keynote speaker at the conference, 
reminded the audience that “leadership is much broader than governance. There 
should be competition in leadership just as there is in business.” Failed compa-
nies go bankrupt and ineffective leaders should be replaced. Although, it is up 
to women, entrepreneurs, youth leaders, and civil society groups to demand 
accountability and work for change. The Markets and Economy panel noted that 
the greatest strength of the African economy is human capital. The development 
of this capital might well lead to economic gains and it will most certainly foster 
the next generation of African leaders.
sessIOn IV: CUltUre & sOCIetY
Sophia Aba Jebel
As chair of the Culture and Society session, Fallou Ngom (Boston University) 
charged the presenters with the task of closing the gap in the understanding 
of diversity, the arts, and culture in Africa. Panelists Bahru Zewde (Forum for 
Social Studies), Marc Sommers (Tufts University), and Heran Sereke-Brhan 
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 (Boston University) drew from their distinct and specialized backgrounds to 
discuss current developments. Bahru Zewde spoke of the importance of indig-
enous knowledge production as a symbol of independent capacity-building 
while Marc Sommers discussed his research on the urban youth movement in 
Sierra Leone, highlighting emerging trends among African youth. Heran Sereke-
Brhan presented on current happenings and trends in African film and music 
production to illustrate the varied mediums of artistic expression continuing to 
emerge from the continent. Though panelists acknowledged many challenges, 
all reported on good news in arts and culture from Africa.
The	Arts	and	Culture	in	Africa’s	Future. In discussing the role and value of the 
arts, Sereke-Brhan quotes Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen: “Music 
and the creative arts will never, of course, replace the need for food and medi-
cine, but nor would food and medicine replace the need for the creative arts.” 
Her presentation addressed an important question: Do African arts and cultural 
expression have a role to play in the continent’s future? Panelists were eager to 
discuss “good news“ in this sphere, and perhaps implicit in that invite was an 
opportunity to finally celebrate African arts and cultures. To celebrate Africa is to 
present Africa as it is: a source of intellectual thought and home to richly diverse 
cultural and artistic expressions, not just a recipient of international aid. Assign-
ing a conference panel to society and culture in Africa broadens the discourse 
and includes interdisciplinary perspectives—and perhaps recognition of Africa’s 
contribution to global sportsmanship, music, film, and knowledge production is 
long overdue. 
According to Sereke-Brhan, the arts serve as a mechanism for “communities 
to wrest meaning out of confrontations.” When discussing arts and culture in 
Africa, referring to the continent as one entity obscures nuanced understand-
ing; though economic and political challenges across African communities are 
similar, there is immense diversity of response to those challenges. Often under-
estimated, this diversity is responsible for a great variety of artistic expression. 
Advances in technology have allowed for the exchange in music, literature, 
and film. A particular set of themes threaded the discussion of trends in art and 
culture: technology, demography, and competition. 
Barhu Zewde highlighted the activities of four prominent African think tanks 
that have received international recognition: the Council for the Development 
of Social Science Research in Africa (CODERSIA), the Organization for Social 
Science Research in East and Southern Africa (OSSREA), the Forum for Social 
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Studies (FSS), and TrustAfrica. CODESRIA and the Centre for Conflict Resolution 
(CCR) were nominated as two of the most influential think tanks globally, and 
CCR was the only African think tank nominated amongst the top 50 non-U.S. 
think tanks. While their rankings are impressive, Zewde emphasizes that the 
importance of these think tanks is that they offer a platform for a distinctly Afri-
can voice. While Africa has suffered from myriad challenges of development, 
think tanks offer a way to foster a tradition of both democratic governance as 
well as a multidisciplinary exchange of knowledge at national and sub-regional 
levels. Think tanks also encourage indigenous knowledge production, resulting 
in research and publications. 
In other areas of society and culture, Zewde noted that Africa has contributed 
significantly to world athletics, and that 2010 marks the first time in which an 
African country (South Africa) has played host to the World Cup. Such achieve-
ments are thus far regarded with skepticism, because, according to Zewde, 
“when it comes to Africa, there will always be question marks.” 
Descriptions of such indicators of progress were met by a reminder of the chal-
lenges faced by Africa’s youth, as described by Marc Sommers. He suggested 
that observing the demographic trends across Africa will help direct attention 
towards future patterns in social development. Sommers noted that, with a 
population whose current average age is 14.5 years, Africa will be young for 
approximately another 30 years. 
Youthful Migrations, Shifting Traditions. Africa’s youth are not exempt from 
global trends, which encourage rural dwellers to migrate towards cities. Youth 
are habitually challenged by economic instability: rural life seems less eco-
nomically and socially promising than the appeal of the city. While globally 
this migration is attributed to economic hardship, Marc Sommers argues that 
traditional cultural roles are also responsible for this shift. 
Globally, gender roles are imbued with economic responsibilities. Sierra Leone, 
like many other African countries, is no exception. A young male is expected to 
marry and can only do so if he owns land. Womanhood is dependent on being 
married and having children. But Sommers notes that the current reality is 
that most youth will not have access to rural land. The overwhelming migra-
tion from rural communities to urban settings exacerbates this reality. On the 
surface, in Sierra Leone this migration is a result of traditional gender roles. 
Using a fiscal lens, not having access to land is an economic issue, not a cultural 
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problem. Thus, in non-African countries this migration is easily attributed to the 
political and economic climate. Yet in Africa, Sommers attributes this shift to 
cultural traditions. In the past, these culture-based gender roles have served a 
social and economic function to rural society, but that is now changing. 
Sommers notes that African cities “do not make economic sense.” However, 
the overwhelming majority of the population is expressing that African rural 
life does not make economic 
sense either. The migration 
from rural farms of Sierra 
Leone to Freetown is a cul-
tural response to economic 
and political challenges, 
which arguably are the 
residual effects of globaliza-
tion. Culture is elastic; it is 
the best equipped system to 
respond rapidly to unan-
ticipated changes in climate (drought), politics (coups d’états), and economic 
challenges (recessions). Therefore, much like the youth, culture cannot afford 
to be neglected. 
Inherent in studying African youth is a study of the location in which they live: the 
urban setting. According to Sommers, scholars could focus on the dangers and chal-
lenges of urbanization, but given the demographic trends, which indicate current 
and pending “youth bulges,” it seems it could be more beneficial to observe the 
advantages of urbanization. Cities provide youth an opportunity for independence, 
autonomy, and exposure to capital markets. Sommers explains that the latent issue 
of urbanization is that it results in a marginalization of the youth from the major-
ity of the population. To address this challenge, Sommers proposes beginning the 
conversation among international actors. Given Africa’s history with political and 
economic colonialism and the push for a bottom-up, internal approach to resolving 
inequities (as highlighted by Zewde’s discussion), this raises an important question 
of agency: in the context of social change, should we not prioritize African participa-
tion in forging solutions above that of international actors? 
The youth are surviving—if just barely. Could it be that the words of Bob Marley 
in the streets of Accra or the presence of Nollywood street vendors in Lagos have 
provided the soundtrack and visual setting for the somewhat peaceful urbaniza-
Sommers notes that African cities “do 
not make economic sense.” However, the 
overwhelming majority of the population is 
expressing that African rural life does not 
make economic sense either. The migra-
tion from rural farms of Sierra Leone to 
 Freetown is a cultural response to economic 
and political challenges, which arguably are 
the residual effects of globalization.
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tion of African cities? Sommers’s assessment of urbanization and African youth was 
followed by Sereke-Brhan’s discussion of specific artistic mediums. The quest and 
pursuit of identity and history define certain typologies of African film within which 
lie a wealth of variation in content. How films and music are produced and where 
they are showcased point to complex interactions between aesthetic expressions 
and economic realities on local and global levels. African arts production is not 
completely independent of international influence. West African film production is 
largely funded by France, which also supports the Festival Pan African du Cinéma 
de Ouagadougou (FESPACO), the largest African film gathering held biannually. 
Good News, but Challenges Remain. The world has much to look forward to 
from Africa. The panel illustrated that there are indeed positive accomplish-
ments to report, although tempered with challenges. Africa’s first opportunity 
to host the World Cup combined with rapid advances in technology (mobile 
telephones and internet access) suggests that 2060 might be an overestimate 
of the time required to observe significant change. This picture is complicated 
by the fact that availability of technology has not resulted in tangible develop-
ment—for example, people have mobile phones but it still takes them hours to 
reach a hospital. Other challenges include the production and distribution of 
technological and artistic goods. However, the creation of various think tanks 
signifies an advance in knowledge production and capacity building. 
Similar positive trends to look for include growth in the private sector, strengthened 
government recognition of the arts, and a swap of heavy investment from foreign to 
domestic investors. There have been efforts by the World Bank to engage in culture 
to support the African music industry, although these efforts should be monitored 
and regulated closely by leaders within the African entertainment industry. Accom-
panied with growth of the film and music industry is a growth in concomitant 
industries: marketing and advertising, patent laws, music and film production, and 
security and performance venues, which will provide employment opportunities 
that will in turn create a need for skilled employees. We can look forward to training 
institutes and/or educational institutions expanding career placement opportunities.
Though usually one might hesitate to refer to Africa as one entity, the conference 
provided safe space for attendees and panelists to discuss Africa, the continent. 
Sereke-Brhan concluded both her presentation and the conference with a 
discussion of music. African music serves as a great reminder of the immense 
diversity of expression that prevails and will continue to color “good news” from 
the continent.
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3.  trends and Projections:  
africa’s Challenges, Past and Future
Edited and introduced by Alfredo Burlando
No report on international development is complete without a statistical 
appendix. This generally includes a long list of numbers representing economic 
and social indicators, organized by year, country, and region, neatly organized 
in columns, for pages on end. The statistical appendix usually offers a sense of 
great hidden knowledge, with little in the way of what insights one can gain by 
processing those numbers. In this report, we believe that these trends deserve 
more attention than simply being tucked into an appendix. We therefore 
replace the rows of numbers with graphs, charts, and maps, in the hope that 
these provide more analysis and some immediate insights about what Africa’s 
past might have to say about its future. For this purpose, we selected some 
widely available indicators (mostly on sub-Saharan Africa) and organized them 
in sections—economic performance, governance, social development, demogra-
phy, technological progress, and resource use. For each indicator we provide an 
illustration and a brief explanation of its meaning and significance. 
What	do	numbers	tell	us	about	Africa? One thing that became very clear as we 
organized the raw data into graphs was that our own view of Africa’s perfor-
mance depended very much on what Africa was compared to. In comparison 
with countries in other continents, there is little in these indicators to gener-
ate optimism about sub-Saharan Africa. The numbers point to high levels of 
poverty, low gross domestic products, poor institutional development, weak 
governments, low levels of education, unhealthy populations, and so on. Rela-
tive to Southeast Asia, Latin America, or Eastern Europe, one could be justified 
in thinking that Africa is, and remains, a basket case. 
There is, however, another perspective that compares sub-Saharan Africa’s 
recent evolution to its own past. From this vantage point, it is much clearer 
that there has been progress. For the past 15 years, economic growth has 
been sustained, democracy has taken hold across vast swathes of the con-
tinent, and levels of education and health have increased. Indeed, many 
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African governments are better and more efficiently run today than they were 
15 years ago.
Looking at the overall positive and negative trends, there are at least two major 
questions about the future. The first is whether sub-Saharan African countries 
are taking divergent paths. One Africa—comprised of countries in the east, 
south, and some western nations—is fast-growing, increasingly educated, and 
democratic, focused on setting the foundations for future growth and integra-
tion in the world economy. The other Africa—made up mostly of Central Africa 
and some Sahel nations—is 
being left behind, and suffers 
from unstable governments, 
low levels of social spend-
ing, and weak governance 
structures. The second ques-
tion looms over the impact 
that the global financial crisis 
will have on the continent. 
As the figures in this section 
show repeatedly, global crises 
(such as the oil crisis in the 
1970s, and the debt crisis in the early 1980s) have often marked turning points 
in Africa’s prospects. This past speaks ominously for the future, given the havoc 
caused by the current crisis worldwide. Nonetheless, projections indicate strong 
growth on the continent. With African nations better prepared today than they 
were in the past to confront economic crises—thanks to more solid economic 
foundations—there is some hope that the continent will continue with its current 
upward trajectory.
How	did	we	choose	the	indicators? We chose these indicators out of hundreds 
available from dozens of sources based on several criteria. First, we decided 
early on to compare Africa against itself and not against the rest of the world. 
(Although in some instances we do show cross-continent comparisons.) Because 
of this choice, we favored indicators that had a clear historical record, with data 
points over decades. Second, we also wanted indicators that pointed to substan-
tial present and future trends. Thus, while information about internet coverage 
and telephony was limited both in time and in its past importance, we highlight 
their impact by including projections for the future. Third, we exclude many 
important indicators (such as poverty, inequality, financial depth, and press 
One Africa—comprised of countries in the 
east, south, and some western nations—is fast 
growing, increasingly educated, and demo-
cratic, focused on setting the foundations for 
future growth and integration in the world 
economy. The other Africa—made up mostly 
of Central Africa and some Sahel nations—is 
being left behind, and suffers from unstable 
governments, low levels of social spending, 
and weak governance structures.
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freedom) that were limited either in quantity, or quality, or availability. Many 
indicators do not go back in time for long or are seldom collected. Others (such 
as commonly used inequality measures) had multiple sources that offered differ-
ent, competing values. 
How	are	the	figures	constructed? The selected indicators, by and large, were 
measured through the years at the country level. We aggregated countries by 
region, and provide the time series evolution for East, West, Central, and South-
ern Africa separately. An issue we confronted in aggregating was how to consider 
countries of different sizes. This is particularly problematic on a continent where 
the best performing nations are often islands on the periphery, such as Cape 
Verde and Mauritius, or are sparsely populated countries such as Botswana and 
Namibia. Within each region, we weighed each country’s indicator score by its 
population at the time, so that big countries counted more than smaller nations. 
The advantage of this method is that it provides a measure for the “average” 
African living in East, West, Central, or Southern Africa. It provides, in our view, 
a better statement of Africa as a whole than other weighted measures—which 
often implicitly favor the country with the largest amount of the indicator being 
measured. The disadvantage is that such “average” Africans tend to be Nigerian, 
Ethiopian, South African, or Congolese. With the exclusion of southern Africa, 
this average representation favors countries that are poorly run and lowly 
developed. If anything, then, the graphs presented here tend to under-represent 
progress for non-Nigerians, non-Ethiopians, and non-Congolese. 
What	figures	are	included? This part of the report is organized in six sections, 
with two or three indicators per section. A standard measure of economic	
development is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Africans have wit-
nessed periods of both great economic growth and decline. The most recent 
phase—which involved a healthy pace of economic expansion—has often been 
attributed to its mineral and oil wealth, and to the high prices these commanded 
during the 2000s. The second graph explores trends in the commodity prices, 
to highlight that this explanation goes only so far. More precisely, it plots terms 
of trade, which measure the price of overall exports (as mentioned, mostly 
minerals, oil, and agricultural products) relative to the price of imports (mostly 
finished goods and oil for non-exporter countries). The high values seen in the 
2000s imply that the trade environment was very favorable to Africa, and in all 
likelihood this was due to the high commodity prices. Nonetheless, terms of 
trade were favorable in the 1980s, too—a time where the local economy was in 
continuous decline. 
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A key element of the potential for economic opportunity and living standards is 
the governance of a country. To measure that elusive element, we turned to the 
African Governance Indicator, which was first put together by the Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation and is currently maintained by the Kennedy School of Government 
at Harvard University as a way to make African governments accountable for 
their performance. The governance index has the advantage of using definite cri-
teria and “objective” data sources. Unfortunately, the index has been around for 
less than a decade, and was thus unable to capture the great strides in democra-
tization that took place in the 1990s. A better sense of the historical trajectory is 
provided by the Freedom House index, for which we have data starting from the 
1970s. The index traditionally relies on analysis of less reliable data, and a judg-
ment of a country may have been based on information from secondary sources 
such as newspapers and “grey” publications and subjective indicators as much as 
hard ones. Even with these weaknesses, it provides a good approximation of the 
trajectory of the democratic progress in Africa. 
The following two sections present data on two important aspects of social 
development that are closely tied to governance and economic development: 
health and education. Expenditures on both sectors (as a fraction of the coun-
try’s GDP) have not changed much over time, with the possible exception of a 
large increase in education spending in East Africa after the year 2000. Despite 
this, we show some evidence that services are reaching more and more Africans: 
we provide the example of immunization rates for one-year-olds (which are 
converging towards full vaccine coverage), and a measure of schooling, the gross 
enrollment rate (which measures the fraction of children who attend a given 
grade as a fraction of all children who are old enough to attend that grade). After 
falling throughout the 1980s and 1990s, enrollment has increased significantly, 
and now the vast majority of children are in school. 
We present historical and future projections of population	trends and total fertil-
ity. Africa’s population is growing at a brisk pace, but the rate of growth is declin-
ing. The decline in the rate of growth is largely due to the fact that total fertility 
(the average number of children born to a woman through her lifetime) has been 
falling and is projected to continue falling. 
We also include both historical data and projections on the use of telephones (both 
landlines and cellular) and the Internet. Africa’s Information	Technology	(IT) future 
is already here: cellular phone use is growing faster than on any other continent, 
and African IT companies have pioneered mass-use services that were subse-
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quently introduced elsewhere, such as banking on mobile phones and satellite-
based Internet. Recent heavy investments in telecommunications (including several 
submarine cables) have increased bandwidth and reduced costs of Internet access. 
Extensive competition and light regulation have resulted in declining prices and 
more innovation, and we are yet to see the full extent of the IT revolution in Africa.
We conclude with a review of the use	of	resources in Africa through data on 
energy use and the change in forest cover. Again, the prevailing view has been 
very negative, with Africans accused of massive deforestation to fuel wood-
stoves, to cite an example. Recent data from the Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion (FAO), however, indicates that deforestation is slowing—in contrast to trends 
in South and Southeast Asia and Latin America, where the rate is high and 
increasing. Finally, energy consumption in Africa remains low, and, as a conse-
quence, so do global warming emissions. Per capita consumption has remained 
substantially flat, unlike other developing areas of the world. 
aFrICan sUb-reGIOns
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seCtIOn 1: eCOnOMIC deVelOPMent
Source: Penn World Tables 6.3, August 2009.
Africa’s economies entered the post-independence period with strong and 
sustained economic growth. With the first oil shock in 1973, most economies 
stopped growing and began a long period of deterioration that continued until 
the mid-1990s. Only Southern Africa fared better: it was not until the 1980s that 
it entered a slump. The erratic history has taken a sharp turn towards sustained 
growth in the mid-1990s. Since then, income increased by almost one-third—
with the significant exclusion of central Africans, who remain significantly 
worse off than in the past, likely due to continuous civil strife in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.
Will this 15-year trend of sustained growth last? While Africa suffered an eco-
nomic reversal in the 1970s and 80s, it is not unreasonable to think that in the 
face of another global crisis spurred by the financial meltdown in the Western 
world, the gains could be short lived. Fortunately, many African economies have 
demonstrated resilience to this latter global crisis: preliminary indicators show 
continuing growth in Eastern and Western Africa. 
–A. Burlando 
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Source: World Development Indicators, the World Bank, 2009. 
A country’s terms of trade measures the average price of its exports over that 
of its imports; it shows how favorable a trade environment is for a given coun-
try. African economies are tremendously dependent on the world price of the 
country’s main exports—oil, minerals, and agricultural products. The value of 
these export commodities (relative to the value of the imported goods) suffered 
a steady decline from the 1980s until the mid 1990s, and contributed to a large 
extent toward the decline in the economic performance of the continent. Since 
1995, however, Africa’s terms of trade have steadily improved. 
It is noteworthy that the fast economic growth of the last decade is often attrib-
uted to the unprecedented boom in commodity prices. Yet, it is clear from the 
graph that the terms of trade in the 2000s were not much different from those 
prevailing in the 1980s, a time of economic decline for Africa. 
–A. Burlando
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seCtIOn 2: GOVernanCe 
Index Source: World Peace Foundation, http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org/africangovernance.
html. Note: Higher scores indicate better governance. 2009 index based on most recent scores (2007). 
Results exclude Western Sahara.
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The conventional wisdom about government and governance in Africa—that 
they are uniformly bad—is not only a painful generalization, but is also false. 
Some African nations are safe, well run, and competently managed. Indeed, 
there is great variation in governance within the continent, as demonstrated by 
the governance index. The index ranks countries by their performance on safety 
and security; rule of law, transparency, and corruption; human rights; sustainable 
economic development; and human development. Each category is represented 
by a variety of indicators, and the weighted average of all indicators provides the 
values for the index presented. On the Freedom House scale, higher numbers 
correspond to higher levels of freedom. 
Botswana, Mauritius, Cape Verde, Namibia, and South Africa enjoy stable 
governments, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and a high degree 
of human development. Countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Somalia, Chad, Zimbabwe, and Sudan, on the other hand, have serious prob-
lems of human rights violations, erratic governments, widespread insecurity, and 
limited economic opportunities. 
A striking feature of governance in Africa is that there are clear regional clusters 
in governance quality, with only a few isolated instances of states performing 
categorically different than their neighbors. This reaffirms the strong correlation 
between governance quality and regional stability.  
–A. Burlando and T. Green
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Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972–2007. 
Civil rights and political freedom in Africa are fragile concepts. They swing hope-
fully forward and spectacularly tumble in any given year. These fluctuations wax 
and wane with the tides of war, regional instability, world markets, and foreign 
pressures. Fortunately, the overall trend (as measured by Freedom House) con-
tinues to be positive: the ratio of Africans living in free or partly free countries 
has increased relative to the total population, from 33 percent in 1972 to over 60 
percent in 2008. This is reflected in the graphs presented above and on page 41: 
Africans in 2008 have better access to civil rights and more say on their govern-
ments than Africans in 1988.
–T. Green
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Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972–2007. 
Notable in the graph on page 40 and the one above is the end of the Cold War: 
before 1991, most regions had illiberal states, with most countries showing a 
negative trend or none at all. After that date, the trend is towards improvements 
in all regions (perhaps with the exclusion of Central Africa, where the situation 
remains consistently dismal). Two other particular moments of significance are 
jumps towards more civil liberties and political rights observed in Southern 
Africa around 1994–1995 and in West Africa in 1999. These shifts relate to the 
end of apartheid in South Africa and the end of the Abacha regime in Nigeria.  
–T. Green
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seCtIOn 3: deMOGraPHIC trends
Source: Historical data from Penn World Tables 6.3, August 2009. 
Projections from Hughes et al. Patterns of Potential Human Development, 2009.
The African continent is relatively sparsely populated: its 900 million inhabit-
ants are fewer than the 1.1 billion residents of India. However, a combination of 
high fertility rates and relatively young populations implies that the population 
will continue to grow at a brisk pace for the next 50 years. The Pardee Center for 
International Futures predicts that by mid-century, there will be a total popula-
tion of 1.9 billion Africans—double the present number. East and West Africa 
will remain the most populous regions, although most of the growth will occur 
in Central Africa. It is estimated that the rate of population growth will decline 
slightly, from 2.8 percent per year between 2005 and 2025, to 2.5 percent per 
year in the following quarter century.
–A. Burlando 
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Source: Historical data from World Development Indicators, 2010.  
Projections from Hughes et al. Patterns of Potential Human Progress, 2009.
Total fertility measures the average number of children a woman gives birth to 
during her reproductive lifetime. It is closely linked to population growth. Relative 
to some other developing countries, fertility in Africa remains high. Nonethe-
less, African families are getting smaller, at an increasing rate. Relative to other 
countries, African families remain large—an average of five children are born 
for each woman, well above the 2.1 births that are generally needed to keep the 
population from falling. However, that is a significant drop over fertility levels that 
prevailed in the 1960s, when women could expect to have seven children. 
–A. Burlando
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seCtIOn 4: HealtH
Source: World Health Organization Statistical Information Systems (WHOSIS), 2010.
Despite the great health challenges facing the continent, African countries have 
not increased their financial commitment to preserving or maintaining health. 
The total expenditure on health (including both private and public funds) as a 
percentage of GDP has remained steady for the past 10 years, with the excep-
tion of East Africa where health spending marginally increased over the past 
two decades. This contrasts with the experience of developed countries, which 
have seen very large increases in expenditures going towards health (almost 14 
percent in the U.S.). 
Despite a lack of growth in resources, there are some indications that health 
services are improving in many countries, as are health outcomes. Yet, trans-
formative gains in health are unlikely to be achieved unless the sector receives 
significant additional resources across the continent. 
–J. Mercurio
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Source: World Health Organization Statistical Information Systems (WHOSIS), 2010.
Immunization rates in regions across Africa have increased over time, but even 
in Southern Africa (with 90 percent of children receiving DTP 3), there is still 
work to be done. The three-dose DTP 3 vaccine is given to one-year-olds to 
prevent diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus, and needs to be 
given to 85 percent of children to ensure herd immunity against diphtheria and 
92 percent for pertussis. In 2007, most regions had converged to a 65–90 percent 
coverage, but, excluding Southern Africa, all of the regions are still well below 
other areas of the world (see graph on the next page), especially the 92 and 94 
percent coverage in the American and European regions, respectively. 
–J. Mercurio
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Source: Centers for Disease Control, 2010.
As the graph on the previous page shows, Southern Africa has the highest vac-
cination coverage, at 90 percent of children. Central and Western Africa saw the 
most dramatic increases in coverage, with a 51 and 43 percent improvement 
from 1990 to 2007, respectively. The improvement in Central Africa is even more 
striking when comparing the lowest point (across all regions) of 32 percent cov-
erage in 1992 to the final coverage rate of 65 percent (a 103 percent increase). 
–J. Mercurio
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seCtIOn 5: edUCatIOn
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://stats.uis.unesco.org. Accessed March 2010.
Africa will not be able to sustain rapid growth without investing in the education 
of its people. Many governments will need to implement changes in the way edu-
cation is financed and managed. So far, at least on financing, the continent as a 
whole is sending mixed signals. Educational expenditure shows divergent trends 
across regions in the past—mostly plummeting to various degrees. East and 
South Africa have generally maintained a certain level of spending for education 
between the 1970s and the 2000s, whereas Central and West Africa have devoted 
fewer and fewer resources to this sector. Since the 1980s, the share of GDP spent 
on education has decreased in 13 nations. Perhaps more significant, this share is 
still less than three percent in 10 countries, mostly concentrated in West Africa.
The silver lining is that, from the new millennium onwards, in both East and 
West Africa resources for education have increased tremendously, and access has 
been made easier by eliminating school fees in several countries (most notably in 
Kenya). It is hoped that the rest of the continent will take notice and do likewise.
–T. Mukhopadhyay 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://stats.uis.unesco.org. Accessed March 2010.
A measure of schooling attainment is the gross enrollment rate or GER—the 
number of children enrolled in a grade as a proportion of the number of chil-
dren who belong to that grade. Many countries had a GER of over 100, which 
implies that a country is engaged in “catching up” by enrolling older children 
into primary schools. Once this catching up is complete, and children who are 
too old for their grade have completed their education, GER values must decline 
to below 100 (as is happening in Southern Africa).
Primary enrollment growth slowed in the 1980s. The GER fell by almost 30 
percent when the economic crisis severely affected schools. Declining public 
resources and private economic hardship resulted in an erosion of primary level 
participation rates. As of the 21st century, some of these setbacks have begun to 
reverse. East and West Africa have recently expanded education; in some coun-
tries such as Kenya, this was achieved by eliminating schooling fees. 
–A. Burlando and T. Mukhopadhyay 
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seCtIOn 6: InFOrMatIOn
Source: Index of African Governance, 2009. 
Projections from Hughes et al. Patterns of Potential Human Development, 2009.
Africa has had the highest growth in mobile phone use globally—twice the global 
average over the past three years, according to Hamadoun Touré, head of the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Across all African regions, tele-
phone usage has increased significantly within the past two decades, signifying a 
continent-wide increase in access to technology. Data from the 1990s helps illus-
trate the dramatic positive increase between 2000 and 2007. In 2007, approxi-
mately 95 percent of South Africans had a phone—the highest on the continent 
and comparable with OECD nations. As of 2005, according to the ITU, more than 
$8 billion was invested in Africa’s telecommunications infrastructure. Heavy 
investments in cell phone banking or “mobile money,” such as that started with 
the M-Pesa program in Kenya, are driving innovation and usage.
Projections indicate that cell phone coverage will continue its rapid increase, and 
only a small minority of Africans will not have cellular phones by mid-century.
–S. Aba Jebel
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Source: ITU African Telcommunication/ICT Indicators 2008. 
Projections from Hughes et al. Patterns of Potential Human Progress, 2009.
Internet connections in Africa have consistently increased from 2000 to 2007, 
albeit from a very small base. In 2007, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, The Central African 
 Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were estimated as the least 
connected. Coverage is estimated to increase rapidly throughout the continent, and 
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) projects that by 2012 more than 
a third of Africa’s citizens will have access to broadband Internet. Major infrastruc-
tural investments have been made in adding undersea optical cables for high speed 
Internet that connect coastal countries in Southern and East Africa to Europe and 
India. It is hoped that these will lead to increased reliability and lower broadband 
prices, which in turn could spur the growth of Internet-related outsourcing industry.
Though the opportunities have grown, the ITU suggests that Africa can improve 
quality of Internet activity. One of the challenges of improving quality of Internet 
development is that a majority of Internet traffic is directed outside the con-
tinent. The lack of interconnectivity within the continent serves as one of the 
greatest obstacles to Internet development as well as one of the greatest incen-
tives to expand and improve access within the continent. 
–A. Burlando and S. Aba Jebel 
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seCtIOn 7: resOUrCes
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, 2010.
Deforestation remains a significant problem in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily 
because forests are actively used for charcoal production and as an important 
source of domestic fuel. The subcontinent continues to lose forests at a relatively 
fast pace, with only South Asia, Southeast Asia, and North Africa having a faster 
rate. Fortunately, the rate of deforestation is declining. This is somewhat surprising, 
since population pressure keeps increasing. The pattern for Africa is not unique: 
overall, deforestation is slowing down around the world, with only Latin America 
and South and Southeast Asia losing more forests today than in the 1990s. 
–A. Burlando
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration: http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/wecbtu.html. Accessed 
March 20, 2010.
Energy consumption for the African continent has remained essentially flat for 
the past 30 years, whereas that of Asia and the Middle East has doubled from 
1980. Low growth in consumption is happening even though Africans consume 
fewer barrels of oil per person than any other people in the world. Growth in 
energy consumption is intimately related to growth in the economy. Hence, the 
graph highlights that Africa is, and remains, an economic laggard when com-
pared to other emerging economies. Second, growth in energy is also correlated 
with growth in greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, it is also clear that Africa does 
not have to go as far as others in reducing emissions. Just like with information 
technology, Africa can hope to move into a low-carbon economy without having 
invested too heavily in a carbon infrastructure. 
–A. Burlando
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she worked on a range of academic and cultural projects. She received a BA 
from Mills College in Oakland, California, then went on to graduate school in 
African History at Michigan State University, studying with Harold Marcus, a Dis-
tinguished Professor in Ethiopian Studies. Her research interests include social 
and political history, African art history and material culture, as well as African-
American and Caribbean history. 
Jonathon Simon 
Professor of International Health, School of Public Health, Boston University 
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Pardee Center aFrICa 2060 PrOjeCt PUblICatIOns
Coffee,	Culture,	and	Intellectual	Property:	Lessons	for	Africa	from	the	Ethiopian	
Fine	Coffee	Initiative
  Heran Sereke-Brhan 
The Pardee Papers No. 11, July 2010 
Sub-Saharan	Africa	at	a	Crossroads:	A	Quantitative	Analysis	of	Regional	Development
  Zachary C. Tyler and Sucharita Gopal 
The Pardee Papers No. 10, May 2010 
Africa	2060:	Good	News	from	Africa
 Pardee Center Conference Report, April 2010
Envisioning	Africa’s	Future:	A	Story	of	Changing	Perceptions
 Julius Gatune Kariuki 
Issues in Brief No. 13, March 2010 
Narcotics	Trafficking	in	West	Africa:	A	Governance	Challenge
 Peter L. McGuire 
The Pardee Papers No. 9, March 2010 
The	Changing	Shape	of	Malnutrition:	Obesity	in	sub-Saharan	Africa
 Arianna Fogelman  
Issues in Brief No. 11, December 2009 
A	Call	for	a	Resilience	Index	for	Health	and	Social	Systems	in	Africa
 Astier Almedom 
Issues in Brief No. 10, October 2009 
Learning	from	the	Past:	The	Future	of	Malaria	in	Africa
 Melissa Graboyes   
Issues in Brief No. 8, June 2009 
All publications are available for download as PDF files at www.bu.edu/pardee/publications. 
Hard copies are available by email request to pardee@bu.edu.
Pardee House
67 Bay State road
Boston, Massachusetts 02215
www.bu.edu/pardee
Email: pardee@bu.edu
Tel: 617-358-4000
Fax: 617-358-4001
ISBn 978-0-9825683-6-1
The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University 
convenes and conducts interdisciplinary, policy-relevant, and future-oriented research that can 
contribute to long-term improvements in the human condition. Through its program of research, 
publications, and events, the Pardee Center seeks to identify, anticipate, and enhance the long-
term potential for human progress, in all its various dimensions.
As part of its mission, the Pardee Center sponsors public conferences on topics that are particu-
larly relevant to the global longer-range future. Such conferences feature interdisciplinary panels 
of experts who are asked to present their perspectives and play an active role in discussing the 
topic with all conference participants. The Pardee Center Conference Reports are published in 
association with selected conferences to provide reflections on the discussions and capture the 
highlights of the panel presentations. They are intended to help disseminate expert knowledge 
and inform ongoing discussions about important issues that ultimately will influence the direction 
of long-term human development.
Africa 2060: Good News from Africa
As the keystone event of a research program called “Africa 2060,” the 
Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future 
at Boston University convened a conference on April 16, 2010 called 
Africa 2060: Good News from Africa. The program featured more 
than a dozen expert panelists from Boston University and around the 
world. Approximately 100 attendees included many African scholars and citizens from the con-
tinent who contributed to lively and well-informed discussions. This Pardee Center conference 
was co-sponsored by Boston University’s Africa Studies Center (ASC), the African Presidential 
Archives & Research Center (APARC), and the Global Health & Development Center (GHDC).  
This report provides commentary reflecting upon and information pertaining to the substance of 
the conference. An introductory overview looks at the major issues discussed at the event, which 
are placed within the larger literature on Africa’s future. Four short essays prepared by Boston 
University graduate students provide readers with more specific reflections and highlights of 
each conference session and the main issues discussed by panelists. The final section presents 
analyses of key trends and projections related to societal, economic, and governance issues for 
Africa and a commentary on what this information tells us about the drivers that will determine 
the continent’s future.  
We hope this conference report offers insights into new directions for Africa in the first half  
of the 21st century. Video of the conference is available at the Pardee Center website at  
www.bu.edu/pardee/multimedia. For more information about the Africa 2060 project, visit 
www.bu.edu/pardee/research/africa-2060/.
